The illegality defence in corporate law claims against directors and officers by WAN, Wai Yee
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
1-2016
The illegality defence in corporate law claims
against directors and officers
Wai Yee WAN
Singapore Management University, wywan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WAN, Wai Yee. The illegality defence in corporate law claims against directors and officers. (2016). Hong Kong Law Journal. 46, (1),
225-254. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1921
1 
 
Revised 17 Nov 15 
 
[TITLE] THE ILLEGALITY DEFENCE IN CORPORATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST 
DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS  
 
Wai Yee Wan* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
If a company incurs substantial fines or other pecuniary losses as a result of its unlawful 
conduct, can the company obtain an indemnity from its director/officer for having caused the 
company to incur such fines and losses? In particular, can the director/officer utilise the defence 
of illegality, notwithstanding that he has breached his duties owed to the company? The illegality 
defence, which raises the twin issues of the relationship between the unlawful act to the 
corporate claim and the attribution of the unlawful act to the company, has been the subject of 
detailed analysis recently in England, Singapore and Hong Kong. This article argues that absent 
clear legislative intention, there is no reason for English law to bar the claims against the 
delinquent director/officer, once regard is made to the relevant constituencies of the company. In 
particular, there is no reason for the illegality defence to operate if the result will prejudice the 
non-complicit constituencies of the company, such as the creditors where company is insolvent 
or where the company has innocent participants. Likewise, it argues that in determining the 
proper scope of the attribution of the acts or knowledge of the delinquent director/officer to the 
company, regard should also be made to the relevant constituencies of the company. If the result 
is one that does not lead to the delinquent director/officer benefitting from the corporate claim, 
there is no reason to attribute the wrongdoing so as to bar the corporate claim.  
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[A head] Introduction 
 
When a company undertakes an unlawful act and exposes the company to substantial 
fines or other pecuniary losses, the question arises as to whether the company may then recover 
its fines, expenses and other losses from its directors and officers, in the absence of the relevant 
legislation specifically providing for, or denying a claim by, the company. In these cases, the 
board may either have made a specific decision to cause the company to undertake the unlawful 
conduct or may have failed to prevent the unlawful conduct from undertaken by its subordinates 
acting on the company’s behalf. While the board is not likely to sue one of its own members, the 
action may be brought by a differently constituted board following a takeover1 or shareholders 
pursuant to the statutory derivative action.2  
 
Claims by the company for losses arising from its unlawful acts against the directors and 
officers, particularly those who have not benefited personally from the wrongdoing, present 
several difficult issues relating to duties of directors/officers and corporate illegality. The 
company has the incentive to make these claims as it will generally not be able to claim for the 
fine/penalty from its own insurer,3 and may wish to have recourse against its directors or 
employees for negligence or breach of duty of care, particularly if they themselves are covered 
                                                 
*Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. I am grateful to Professor Eilis Ferran and 
the anonymous reviewer for their comments on an earlier draft of the article. All errors are mine alone.  
1  For an example of a corporate action by a company against its former directors and employees, see Safeway 
v Twigger [2010] EWCA Civ 1472  (facts and holding discussed below). 
2  UK Companies Act 2006, Part 11. 
3  FCA Handbook, GEN 6.1.5: "No firm may enter into, arrange, claim on or make a payment under a 
contract of insurance that is intended to have, or has or would have, the effect of indemnifying any person against all 
or part of a financial penalty" 
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by directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. However, there may be good policy reasons to bar 
recovery, including not negating the effects of the criminal penalty. Yet, shareholders or 
creditors (where the company is insolvent) may not have participated in the wrongdoing at all 
and it appears harsh that the company is denied the claim from its directors or officers.  
 
This issue of recovery by the company against its directors or officers has practical 
significance. While there are few criminal prosecutions of companies, particularly for economic 
crimes, this is likely going to change with the introduction of deferred prosecution agreements in 
the UK Crime and Courts Act 2013, and the increase in fines for fraud, bribery and money 
laundering offences on companies will result in the issue becoming even more important.4 In 
addition, inaction or inadequate procedures may also expose the company to offences; under the 
UK Bribery Act 2010, it is now an offence for a company which has failed to undertake 
necessary procedures to prevent its associated persons from committing bribery.5 Further, the 
UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 now allows the third party investors to bring civil 
claims against a company (but not its officers)6 in respect of false and misleading statements 
made by directors or officers on behalf of the company; it is not inconceivable that shareholders 
will bring derivative claims against the directors or officers, on behalf of the company, for an 
                                                 
4  See Sentencing Council, Fraud, bribery and money laundering: corporate offenders: Definitive Guideline; 
the Sentencing Council (“Sentencing Guidelines”).   The Sentencing Council has adopted a similar methodology to 
that currently used by the UK Financial Conduct Authority which determines the starting figure from a percentage 
of the ‘relevant revenue’ derived from the alleged conduct. The financial risk to companies is increased by the 
multipliers which will be applied to this base figure in order to determine the final penalty. The Definitive 
Guidelines recommend a multiplier of as much as 400 per cent in the most egregious cases. 
5  Bribery Act 2010, section 7. 
6  Financial Services and Markets Act, s 90A, read with Schedule 10.   
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indemnity in respect of causing the company to incur these losses7 as well as for incurring civil 
penalties. 8  
 
In England, the issue of illegality in corporate claims against directors or employees arose 
in the Court of Appeal decision in Safeway v Twigger9 and more recently, in the Supreme Court 
decision in Jetivia v Bilta.10 Even though the issue did not arise directly in Moore Stephens v 
Stone & Rolls (Stone & Rolls),11 the issue was considered by each member of the House of 
Lords. Elsewhere outside the UK, the issues relating to corporate illegality and corporate 
attribution were also considered by appellate courts in Singapore in Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix 
(Ho v Scintronix)12 and in Hong Kong in Moulin Global Eyecare v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (Moulin Global Eyecare).13 
 
The above-mentioned cases highlight the difficulties and policy debates as to the scope of 
the illegality defence. In Safeway, whose facts are further set out below, the recovery by the 
company against its directors/officers for fines and other expenses incurred consequent upon its 
infringement of the Competition Act 1998 was held to be barred on the ground of illegality. Two 
reasons were given: first, the illegality defence applies because the liability of the company to 
pay the fine was regarded as personal and not vicarious; second, there were good policy reasons 
under the Competition Act 1998 militating against such recovery. While the former reasoning 
                                                 
7  See Paul Davies QC, Davies Review of Issuer Liability: Final Report (June 2007), para 57. 
8  Financial Services and Markets Act, s 118.  
9  Safeway v Twigger [2010] EWCA Civ 1472. 
10  Jetivia v Bilta [2015] UKSC 23. 
11  Moore Stephens v Stone & Rolls (Stone & Rolls) [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 1391. 
12  Ho v Scintronix [2014] 3 SLR 329; [2014] SGCA 22. 
13  Moulin Global Eyecare v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Moulin Global Eyecare) [2014] HKCFA 22. 
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was doubted by Lords Toulson and Hodge in Jetivia v Bilta,14 Lord Neuberger (with whom 
Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed) preferred not to address the correctness of the outcome of 
Safeway,15 noting the complexity of the issue. Likewise, Lord Mance held that the correctness of 
Safeway should be determined on another occasion.16 In Singapore, the opposite conclusion was 
reached, where the Court of Appeal in Ho v Scintronix held that the claim for the value of the 
bribe paid by the company against its chief executive officer was not barred on the ground of 
illegality. In Hong Kong, the majority of the Court of Final Appeal in Moulin Global Eye Care 
clarified the law on corporate attribution of the management’s fraud to the company by drawing 
a distinction between the “redress” and “liability” cases; the former being cases where the 
company is suing the director/officer for wrongs done to it and the latter being cases where the 
third party is bringing an action against the company for a wrong. For redress cases, the wrongful 
acts of the company’s management will not be attributed to the company, rendering the illegality 
irrelevant. 
 
The aim of this article is to provide a taxonomy of the illegality defence in loss shifting 
claims17 that are brought by the companies against their delinquent directors or officers in respect 
of losses incurred by the company arising from its unlawful acts under English law and its draws 
on the recent cases that discuss corporate illegality in Singapore and Hong Kong. In particular, 
this article addresses two issues that arise in the illegality defence: first, the relationship between 
the illegal acts to the claim, and second, the proper attribution of the illegal acts to the claimant 
                                                 
14  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), paras [157]-[161]. 
15  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [31]. 
16  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [52]. 
17  The term “loss shifting claims” is borrowed from R. Werder, “A Critical Assessment of Intracorporate Loss 
Shifting after Prosecutions Based on Corporate Wrongdoing” (1993) 18 Del J Corp Law 35. 
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company.18 It is concerned with the situations that the directors/officers have acted in breach of 
their fiduciary duties or duties of care owed to the company and, absent a defence, would be 
otherwise liable to the company. 
 
The article begins by examining the test or relationship between the unlawful act and the 
corporate claim. It sets out the situations where the illegality defence has been applied in 
corporate claims, particularly loss-shifting claims that are brought against directors and officers. 
The article then examines the policy justifications for the illegality defence and argues that 
absent specific legislative justification, none of the policy justifications requires the courts to bar 
such loss-shifting claims from succeeding.  In particular, it is unjust to bar these claims if the 
result prejudices the constituencies of the company who are not complicit to the illegality (such 
as the creditors where the company is insolvent or where there are innocent shareholders).  
 
The article then argues likewise that in determining the proper scope of the attribution of 
the acts or knowledge of the delinquent director/officer to the company, regard should also be 
made to the relevant constituencies of the company. If the result is one that does not lead to the 
delinquent director/officer benefitting from the corporate claim, there is no reason to attribute the 
wrongdoing so as to bar the claim. Using the taxonomy of the three different attribution 
situations developed in Jetivia v Bilta (namely, where (1) the third party is suing the company, 
(2) the company is suing the director/officer or (3) where the company is suing the third party), 
                                                 
18  See also Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex [2014] UKSC 55, where it was pointed out that there are three 
questions in any illegality defence: (1) what are the illegal acts which give rise to the defence; (2) what is the 
relationship between the illegal act and the claim; and (3) on what principles should the illegal act of an agent be 
attributed to the principal, particularly the company. This article is concerned with (2) and (3) as it assumes that (1) 
is normally satisfied in cases involving breach of criminal law.  
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this article argues that in situation (2), attribution should not occur to bar the claim if the 
company is insolvent (since the benefits go to the creditors) or where there are innocent 
shareholders. In situation (3), attribution should not occur if the company is insolvent or if there 
are innocent shareholders, or if the delinquent director/officer (who is also a sole shareholder), 
will not benefit, directly or indirectly, from the corporate claim.   
  
 
 
[A head] The Relationship Between the Unlawful Act and the Corporate Claim  
 
The illegality rule is formulated by the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. However, 
even if the claimant’s conduct is illegal, there needs to be a relationship between the unlawful act 
and the claim for the illegality defence to apply. This rule is expressed to be founded on public 
policy, and not on the basis of achieving discretionary justice between the parties.19 However, 
the complexity of when the illegality defence applies in all areas of private law (and not only in 
corporate law claims) lies in the fact that it is often under-theorised and the cases that have come 
up tend to be confined to their own peculiar facts.20  This is problematic because the courts often 
do not state clearly the kind of connection that will bar the enforcement of an otherwise legal 
obligation.21  
 
                                                 
19  See Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340, at 355 (“It is a principle of policy, whose application is 
indiscriminate and so can lead to unfair consequences as between the parties to the litigation. Moreover the principle 
allows no room for the exercise of any discretion by the court in favour of one party or other”: per Lord Goff of 
Chieveley).  
20  See Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above) at [61].   
21  See Lord Mance (writing extra-judicially), “Ex turpi causa – when Latin avoids liability” (2014) 18 Edin 
LR 175. 
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The modern law relating to the illegality defence in private law actions is found in 
Tinsley v Milligan.22 This involves the assertion of illegality defence in the context of a claim of 
interest in property based on resulting trust by M against T. M and T had earlier entered into a 
scheme where the property was placed in T’s name to enable M to make fraudulent claims to 
social security benefits. In determining whether the illegality defence applied, the House of 
Lords rejected the old “public conscience” test23 and instead applied the reliance test; as M did 
not have to rely on the illegality in proving her interest in the property under the resulting trust, 
the illegality defence did not apply. Critics of the reliance test have argued that the test is 
arbitrary as it turns on the burden of proof; it was only fortuitous that M had the benefit of the 
presumption of resulting trust and thus did not have to rely on aspects of the illegal 
transactions.24  
 
Outside proprietary claims, in other areas of private law including tort law, the English 
courts have not applied the reliance test formalistically in determining whether the illegality 
defence applies.25 The problem is finding the replacement for the reliance test. One of the early 
attempts to replace the reliance test was the “inextricable link”, that is, whether the claimant’s 
claim is so closely or inextricably bound up with his own criminal or illegal conduct.26  
 
                                                 
22  Tinsley v Milligan (n 19 above).  
23  The public conscience test, developed in Thackwell v Barclays Bank [1986] 1 All ER 676  was regarded as 
too vague and resulted in inconsistent decisions, as held by Lord Goff in Tinsley v Milligan. 
24  Eg Law Commission, The Illegality Defence (Law Com 320) (March 2010) [para 1.20]. 
25  Cf Madoff Securities v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 
26  Eg Cross v Kirby, The Times, April 5, 2000 per Beldam LJ, (“claimant’s claim is so closely or inextricably 
bound up with his own criminal or illegal conduct that the court could not permit him to recover without appearing 
to condone the conduct”).  
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In Gray v Thames,27 a tort of negligence claim, the House of Lords rejected the 
inextricable link test and did not find the reliance test helpful.28 Instead, Lord Hoffmann 
introduced the concept of the narrow and wide version of the ex turpi causa rule. In its narrower 
form, the claimant cannot recover damages which flows from the fine or other punishment 
imposed as a consequence of the unlawful act. In its wider form, the rule prohibits the claimant 
from recovering compensation for loss which was suffered in consequence of its own criminal 
act. Both forms are expressed to be based on the consistency rationale. In the narrow form, it is 
inconsistent with criminal law if the claimant can recover the fine or penalties. In the wide form, 
the inconsistency theory applies as well but the approach is causal in nature. According to Lord 
Hoffmann:  
 
“[T]he wider rule has to be justified on the ground that it is offensive to public notions of 
the fair distribution of resources that a claimant should be compensated (usually out of 
public funds) for the consequences of his own criminal conduct. Secondly, the wider rule 
may raise problems of causation which cannot arise in connection with the narrower rule. 
The sentence of the court is plainly a consequence of the criminality for which the 
claimant was responsible. But other forms of damage may give rise to questions about 
whether they can properly be said to have been caused by his criminal conduct.”29 
 
                                                 
27  Gray v Thames Train [2009] 3WLR 167. 
28  Gray v Thames Train (n 27 above), per Lord Hoffmann, paras [30]-[31]. See also Hounga v Allen [2014] 
UKSC 47, [2014] 1 WLR 2889, para [30]; Jetivia v Bilta (n10 above), paras [169]-[172].  
29  Gray v Thames Train (n 27 above), per Lord Hoffmann, para [51]).  
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However, subsequent tort cases have casted doubt on the test articulated by Lord 
Hoffmann. In Hounga v Allen,30 which is a claim based on the tort of discrimination, Lord 
Wilson (with whom Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore agreed) cited the 
reliance test with approval, but on the qualification that it must be tempered by considerations of 
the underlying policy. 31 In the same case, Lord Wilson also applied the inextricable link test, 
holding that the test was not satisfied on its facts.32  
 
[B head] The role of illegality in corporate claims 
 
In the case of corporate claims generally, the reliance test for illegality found some 
favour by certain members of the House of Lords in Stone & Rolls. In Stone & Rolls, the 
company was a vehicle set up to commit fraud on the bank lenders by S, who was also its sole 
controlling shareholder and director. The company borrowed increasingly large sums of money 
from its lenders against bogus purchases of equipment. When the fraud was discovered, the 
company was hopelessly insolvent and S disappeared. The lenders were owed very large sums of 
money by the company. The liquidators of the company sued the auditors on the ground that they 
failed to detect S’s fraud, causing the fraud to be escalated. The auditors applied to strike out the 
claim, on the ground that the company was the perpetrator of the fraud, since S was the directing 
mind and will of the company and his fraud was attributed to the company. The House of Lords, 
by a majority of three-two, struck out the liquidators’ claim. Lord Walker (in the majority) and 
                                                 
30  Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47, [2014] 1 WLR 2889, para [30]. 
31  Hounga v Allen (n 30 above), para [30], holding that the reliance test carries “maximum precedential 
authority”. 
32  Hounga v Allen (n 30 above), para [41]. 
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Lord Brown applied the reliance test in holding that the illegality defence was upheld,33 that is, 
the company’s claim against the auditors was founded on its own illegality, being its ability to 
defraud the banks of more money. 
 
In Safeway, while Stone & Rolls was cited and analysed in great detail, the Court of 
Appeal did not apply the reliance test but adopted the principles of consistency found in Gray v 
Thames. In Safeway, the defendants, the directors and employees of Safeway, brought an 
application to strike out the claims by Safeway, which had sued them for an indemnity. The 
cause of action was for having caused Safeway to be liable for substantial penalties imposed for 
infringing Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998. The directors and employees had 
allegedly engaged in price-fixing with their counterparts in other supermarkets to increase the 
price of the dairy products. Safeway entered into an early resolution agreement with the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT), a form of settlement under which they admitted liability and agreed to pay a 
reduced penalty. The early resolution agreement between Safeway and OFT provided for 
Safeway to pay a fine of £16.5 million, to be reduced to £10.7 million, provided Safeway 
continued to co-operate with the investigations. Safeway sued the defendants, alleging that they 
had breached their employment contracts, fiduciary duties and/or were liable in the tort of 
negligence. 
 
At first instance, Flaux J held that the infringement of Chapter I prohibition was 
sufficiently morally reprehensible to engage the ex turpi causa rule.34 However, it was held that 
                                                 
33  See Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), per Lord Walker, paras [129]-[131]; per Lord Brown, para [205]). 
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the ex turpi causa rule would only apply if the claimant was personally (and not vicariously) 
liable and the evidence showed that claimant was attributed the acts only by reason of the law of 
agency (and hence not personally liable). On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision 
on personal fault.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that the claims for the recovery of the civil penalty and 
associated costs were founded on the illegality of the company: first, according to Longmore LJ 
(with whom Lloyd LJ agreed), both the narrow and wide versions of illegality, as formulated by 
Lord Hoffmann in Gray v Thames, were engaged; the penalties fell within the narrow version 
and the associated costs of defending the quasi-criminal proceedings fell within the wide version. 
  
Second, Pill LJ held that the illegality defence applies if allowing the company to recover 
would undermine the policy objectives of the legislation that criminalises the company’s 
conduct.  Pill LJ held that the policy of the Competition Act 1998 was to attribute liability only 
to the undertaking (in this case, Safeway) and to place the impetus on the undertaking to take 
preventive measures. Allowing the company to claim from the directors (and hence, indirectly, 
D&O policy) would undermine the policy behind imposing personal (as opposed to vicarious 
liability) on the company.35 
                                                                                                                                                             
34  According to Flaux J, the rule may include not only criminal conduct but also quasi-criminal conduct, 
including anti-competitive acts in breach of the Chapter I prohibition in the Competition Act. This aspect of the 
decision was not challenged by the Court of Appeal.  
35  See Safeway Stores v Twigger (n 9 above), para [44]: 
“The policy of the [Competition Act 1998] is to protect the public and to do so by imposing obligations on 
the undertaking specifically. The policy of the statute would be undermined if undertakings were able to 
pass on the liability to their employees, or the employees' D & O insurers. Only if the undertaking itself 
bears the responsibilities, and meets the consequences of their non-observance, are the public protected. A 
deterrent effect is contemplated and the obligation to provide effective preventative measures is upon the 
undertaking itself.” 
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Safeway was a controversial decision.36 Academic commentators have criticised Safeway 
on the grounds that it is anomalous that the culpable directors or employees do not bear the 
consequences of criminal conduct which is carried out by corporation and it is ultimately the 
innocent shareholders or creditors who will be penalised;37 it has also been similarly argued that 
actions against the directors and employees are not passing the liability, but suing them who have 
caused the liability in the first place.38 
 
In a recent Supreme Court decision post-Safeway, in Jetivia v Bilta, it is clear that the 
debate as to the appropriate test for illegality is far from over. In that case, N and C were the 
directors of Bilta which bought and sold credits under the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
Allowances (EUAs) (known as carbon credits) which were subject to VAT. Bilta was also 
owned by C. N and C arranged transactions with various parties, including Jetivia, to ensure that 
Bilta never had sufficient funds to pay the VAT as it became due (known as a carousel fraud). 
Bilta was insolvent from its outset and its liquidators sought to recover damages from the 
directors, Jetivia and Jetivia’s chief executive officer. The defence that was raised was ex turpi 
causa rule, that is, the losses claimed by Bilta arose from the VAT fraud. There were two 
principal issues in the case: the first involving whether the illegality defence arises, and the 
second, whether the fraud of N and C should be attributed to Bilta (the company). 
 
                                                 
36  Eg see Lord Sumption, “Reflections on the Law of Illegality” [2012] RLR 1. 
37  Eg see E. Lim, “The Illegality Defence and Company Law” (2013) 13 JCLS 49. See E. Lim, “A Critique of 
Corporate Attribution: "directing mind and will" and Corporate Objectives” (2013) JBL 333. See also P. Watts, 
“Illegality and agency law: authorising illegal action” (2011) JBL 213. 
38  See P. Watts, “Illegality and agency law: authorising illegal action” (n 37 above), at 220. 
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 There were at least two opposing views on the proper approach to the illegality defence 
canvassed in Jetivia v Bilta.  Lord Sumption saw the issue as one of attribution but accepted that 
the claims against the directors and the other defendants were directly founded on the VAT fraud 
(based on the reliance test), and thus the company was relying on its own illegal acts to found its 
claims against the directors.  Lord Sumption then held that the illegality defence is a rule of law, 
that is, it is independent of the judicial value judgment about the balance of equities in each case. 
According to Lord Sumption, the illegality defence is one of public policy, but narrowly 
formulated; the courts should not be used to enable private parties to get an advantage derived 
from an illegal act.39 As such, he took the view that the reliance test found in Tinsley v Milligan 
was the appropriate test. The inextricable link test in Cross v Kirby would have substantially 
widened the cases in which illegality defence applied.   
 
Lords Toulson and Hodge took a different view; both held that the illegality defence is 
one of a broader public policy, and the court will weigh the considerations of public policy in 
favour of and against applying the illegality defence in the particular circumstances in 
determining for “whose benefit the action was being brought”.40 Lords Toulson and Hodge held 
that the outcome of Safeway was only correct if Pill LJ’s reasoning was accepted, that is, it was 
inconsistent with the Competition Act 1998 in quasi-criminalising the infringing acts to allow the 
recovery. 
 
In balancing the competing aspects of public policy, Lords Toulson and Hodge held that 
where an insolvent company (such as Bilta) is bringing an action against the delinquent director 
                                                 
39  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [60]. 
40  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [141].  
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or officer, the policy of section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 requires that the directors have 
regard to the interests of creditors of an insolvent company or prospectively insolvent company; 
to allow the illegality defence to defeat the insolvent company’s claim would be inconsistent 
with section 172.41  
 
Lord Sumption specifically disagreed with the reasoning of Lords Toulson and Hodge 
that was based on the statutory policy of section 172.42 In Lord Sumption’s view, the common 
law duty to have regard to creditors’ interests, preserved under section 172, does not necessarily 
imply that civil liability should be imposed on directors notwithstanding the illegality defence. 
Further, the illegality defence would have failed even if the company was not insolvent or if the 
defendants were not directors but were merely agents.   
 
 Lord Neuberger (with whom Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed) considered that the 
matter should be considered at a more appropriate forum and while they did not want to express 
a concluded opinion that Safeway was correct, they needed a “great deal of persuading” that the 
Court of Appeal did not arrive the right conclusion.43 Similarly, Lord Mance left the question 
open.  
 
[B head] Assessing the justifications of illegality defence 
 This section argues that absent a clear and specific legislative justification denying 
recovery by the company’s claims against the directors or officers for causing the company to 
                                                 
41  Jetivia v Bilta, (n 10 above), paras [122]-[130]. 
42  Jetivia v Bilta, (n 10 above), paras [98]-[100]. 
43  Jetivia v Bilta, (n 10 above), para [31]. 
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enter into unlawful acts, none of the justifications underlying the defence of illegality requires 
the courts to bar the company’s claims. Denying the claim will not achieve anything worthwhile 
and will instead prejudice creditors (where the company is insolvent) or innocent shareholders 
who are not complicit in the illegality.  
 
 
 [C head] The consistency justification  
 The rationale for the “narrow” form of the illegality defence is that the law should not 
provide a remedy which undermines the criminal law.44 In Hall v Hebert,45 McLachlin J cited 
counsel’s submission that the justification of the illegality defence is founded on consistency 
with criminal law: 
 
“…to allow recovery in these cases would be to allow recovery for what is illegal. It 
would put the courts in the position of saying that the same conduct is both legal, in the 
sense of being capable of rectification by the court, and illegal. It would, in short, 
introduce an inconsistency in the law. It is particularly important in this context that we 
bear in mind that the law must aspire to be a unified institution, the parts of which – 
contract, tort, the criminal law – must be in essential harmony. For the courts to punish 
conduct with the one hand while rewarding it with the other, would be to ‘create an 
intolerable fissure in the law’s conceptually seamless web’: Weinrib – “Illegality as a 
Tort Defence” (1976) 26 U.T.L.J.28 at p. 42. We thus see that the concern, put at its most 
fundamental, is with the integrity of the legal system”. 
                                                 
44  See Lord Hoffmann’s formulation in Gray v Thames (n 27 above) and accompanying text.  
45  Hall v Hebert (1993) 101 DLR (4th) 129, p 165. 
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This justification based on the internal coherence of the law was cited with approval by 
Lord Walker in Stone & Rolls, 46 as well as by the Australian High Court in Miller v Miller.47  
 
In Safeway, the Court of Appeal highlighted the need for consistency in the result in 
criminal and civil law and it would be inconsistent with the policy of the Competition Act 1998, 
which imposes liability on the undertaking, to then recover the penalties from its directors and 
employees. However, a fundamental criticism of the consistency argument is that this 
justification assumes that there is a necessary inconsistency between criminal and corporate law 
when a civil remedy is awarded, despite the company’s participation in the criminal conduct. 
However, once the constituencies of the company are considered, that does not necessarily 
follow. When the company is either solvent or insolvent, the beneficiaries of the claim by the 
company will be the shareholders or creditors respectively. Granting a remedy will not 
necessarily undermine the consistency between criminal and corporate law.  
 
The argument that illegality should be context-specific has found some support in Jetivia 
v Bilta. As outlined above, Lords Hodge and Toulson founded their judgment on the statutory 
policy behind the Companies Act 2006 in holding that the illegality defence is not open to an 
insolvent company which is bringing the claims on behalf of its creditors. The directors owed a 
duty to the creditors, through the company, and allowing the illegality defence to operate will 
                                                 
46  Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), para [128].  
47  Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9, “the central policy consideration at stake is the coherence of the law” per 
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (para [15]). 
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undermine such duty. It is noted, though, that Lord Sumption specifically disagreed with the 
reasoning, holding that the result is the same whether or not the company is insolvent.  
 
 It is submitted that the better view is that expressed by Lords Hodge and Toulson. The 
identity behind the company is important and the outcome of the illegality rule cannot be one 
that results in the constituencies of the company being prejudiced. When the company is 
insolvent, the interests of the creditors ought to prevail. If the company is solvent, such as 
Safeway, the relevant constituency that constitutes the company will be the shareholders. In such 
a case, if the shareholders are not involved or otherwise complicit in the illegality, there is no 
reason for the illegality defence to operate.  
 
I next consider the consistency justification in the wide version of the illegality defence in 
Gray v Thames and applied in Safeway. In Safeway, the Court of Appeal took the approach that 
the costs associated with the OFT investigations, which were regarded as being subsumed under 
the “wide” version of the rule, were not recoverable by the company against the director or 
employee. Referring to Stone & Rolls, it was held that the consistency argument barred such 
claims as well.  
 
 The justification of the wide version of the illegality rule is not immediately self-evident, 
as compared to its narrow version. Taking claims against individuals as an example, while it is 
straightforward to see that civil claims arising from sanctions or penalties imposed on an 
individual will be inconsistent with and undermine criminal law, there are many difficulties in 
justifying denial of the “wide” claims. First, as pointed by Lord Sumption writing extra-
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judicially, the distinction raised by Lord Hoffmann between the wide and narrow version is often 
difficult to apply in the context outside of the peculiar situation in Gray v Thames.48 Second, 
Lord Hoffmann’s formulation that the wider form of the ex turpi causa rule exists because it is 
offensive to the fair distribution of resources paid out of public funds is questionable since many 
of the claims are not so paid out. 
 
However, assuming that the wide version of the illegality rule is part of the justification 
of the illegality defence, in the context of corporate claims, again it is submitted that the courts 
should consider the relevant constituencies. If the company is insolvent, the effect of the 
corporate claim benefits the creditors and not the dishonest shareholders; there is no reason for 
the defence to operate since the shareholder is not benefitting from the consequence of his own 
wrong.  
 
As such, even leaving aside as to whether auditors owed a duty of care to the creditors 
which is not a matter of company law, it is submitted that Stone & Rolls was wrongly decided.49 
Given that the company was insolvent, the majority of the House of Lords should have 
considered the relevant constituencies, being the creditors; there is no inconsistency in allowing 
the company’s claim for the benefit of the creditors and the illegal act of the company in 
defrauding the banks. In this respect, it is submitted that Lord Scott, one of the two dissenting 
judges, saw the issue correctly that consideration should be given to the residual claimants of the 
                                                 
48  See Lord Sumption, “Reflections on the Law of Illegality” (n 36 above).  
49  For criticism of Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), see also E. Ferran, “Corporate Attribution and the Directing 
Mind and Will” (2011) 127 LQR 239; D. Halpern “Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens: An Unnecessary Tangle” 
(2010) 73 MLR 487; P. Watts, “Audit Contracts and Turpitude” (2010) 126 LQR 14. 
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company.50 Likewise, Safeway is wrongly decided since the public shareholders are not 
complicit in the illegality and there is no reason to bar the claim on consistency grounds.  
 
[C head] The reliance principle 
 The reliance principle provides that a claimant seeking to rely on his own illegality 
should be barred from doing so. Quite apart from the fact that it is not self-evident as to why it 
should matter, the reliance principle, when applied mechanistically, can lead to unjust results. As 
argued earlier, the result can be fortuitous depending on whether the issue is framed as part of the 
cause of action or part of the defence. For example, it could be argued that the company is not 
relying on the illegality but on the breach of the duties owed by the directors/ officers in carrying 
out their duties so as to ensure that the company does not suffer harm. There is a breach of these 
duties, irrespective of whether the acts are illegal or not.  
 
The courts have not applied the reliance test automatically without a careful consideration 
as to the underlying policy.51 In claims that are brought by the company, once the relevant 
constituencies of the company are considered, there is no reason to regard the “company” as a 
homogeneous whole, representing the common interests of all the stakeholders. In the case of an 
                                                 
50  See Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), per Lord Scott, para [120]: 
“Take the case of a solvent company that under the direction of its managing director engages in an 
unlawful and, in the event, loss making activity that could and should have been prevented by a timely 
report made by its auditors. Let it be supposed the managing director is also a shareholder and that he and 
the auditors are together sued for negligent breach of duty. I know of no authority that would bar such an 
action on ex turpi causa grounds. The action, assuming it succeeded against both defendants, could be 
expected, via contribution proceedings, to leave the delinquent managing director with no benefit from any 
damages recovered from the auditors. And why, if that were so, should public policy require the auditors to 
be relieved of liability for their breach of duty?” 
 
51  See above, nn 24-25 and accompanying text.  
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insolvent company or a company where the shareholders are not complicit in the illegality, the 
creditors or shareholders respectively are not relying on their illegality in making the claim.  
 
 [C head] Other justifications for the illegality defence 
 
For completeness, it should be mentioned that in other areas of the law of obligations, the 
other justifications that have been raised as underlying the illegality defence include the no profit 
justification and punishment or deterrence.52 Neither is it relevant in the matters under 
consideration in this article. The former is relevant if allowing the claimant to recover would 
permit the claimant to profit from his own criminal action. However, in the corporate law claims 
against the director/officer, the claimant is suing for losses arising from the illegality, rather than 
profiting from its own wrong.  
 
As to deterrence, in R v Reliable Advertising and Addressing Agency53 and Askey v 
Golden Wine Co,54 both cases cited in Safeway, it was held that the civil courts will not allow 
recovery of criminal penalties in civil actions in order to deter the claimants from undertaking 
illegal acts.55 However, the deterrence policy that the court should not encourage the claimant to 
conduct illegally is not applicable in the context of the company’s claim since the company is an 
                                                 
52  See generally, G. Virgo, “Illegality’s Role in the Law of Torts” (M. Dyson (ed), Unravelling Tort and 
Crime (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch 7.  
53  R v Reliable Advertising and Addressing Agency [1915] 1 KB 652. Cf Cointat v Myham & Sons [1913] 2 
KB 220 (the defendants sold the claimant butcher a pig which had tuberculous and the claimant was not aware of the 
state of meat. The inspector seized the meat and the claimant was convicted and fined; the claimant claimed the fine, 
and costs, for having bad meat in his premises and could recover from the defendant. This offence was one of strict 
liability.  
54  Askey v Golden Wine Co [1948] 2 All ER 35. 
55  In Askey v Golden Wine Co [1948] 2 All ER 35, Denning J (at 380) held that the court must have regard “to 
the necessity for deterring him and others from doing the same thing again, to reform him, and, in cases such as the 
present, to make him and others more careful in their dealings”.   
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artificial construct and whose conduct is effected by natural persons. If there is any deterrence, it 
is the deterrence of the directors and officers that is relevant; however, it is difficult to see how 
the executive directors and senior managers will be deterred from causing the company to 
commit the illegal act if the benefits of the illegal conduct are great (which may arise in an 
incentive-based compensation) and the worst that can happen to them is dismissal only or loss of 
reputation or disqualification (in the case of directors). Finally, the justification for denying the 
remedy based on punishing the claimant is better left to criminal law. Even if punishment is an 
appropriate rationale for civil law, it is unclear why current shareholders or creditors of the 
company (if the company is insolvent) should ultimately bear the punishment if the company’s 
claim is denied.  
 
[C head] Undermining of legislation: the availability of D&O insurance  
 
In Safeway, Pill LJ gave a further policy reason that allowing the recovery by the 
company against the directors under the D&O insurance will undermine the policy of imposing 
direct liability on the company pursuant to the Competition Act 1998. While there may be merits 
in the argument that D&O insurance may undermine the threat of liability faced by the company, 
such argument over-states the threat of undermining the legislation and may lead to startling 
outcomes for the reasons set out below.  
 
First, fact that the company may be able to recover the losses arising from the sanctions 
or other consequences from its directors does not necessarily mean that it is completely immune 
from the threat of liability faced as a result of the penal consequences. In particular, a 
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director/officer whose D&O insurance cover is inadequate may end up facing liabilities out of 
pocket.  
 
Second, the outcome of Safeway may be compared with the outcome in Brumder v 
Motornet,56 which involved a breach of regulation 5 of the UK Provision and Use of Work 
Equipment Regulations 1998.57 The claimant, the director-cum-shareholder in a one-man 
company was injured in the course of the work as a result of the company breaching its 
obligation to maintain safety in its equipment. The responsibility for maintaining the equipment 
fell on the claimant (as director), which brought a claim against the company (and its insurer). 
The Court of Appeal held that the company was liable for damages to injured director for breach 
of the statutory obligation, and would be able to recover such damages from the director, 
notwithstanding the fact that the company was criminally liable under the workplace regulation. 
The result was that the director could not claim against the company damages due to circuity in 
action. The Court of Appeal held that Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies58 applied to deny the 
claim where the employee is unable to seek damages for breach of statutory duty from his 
employer if the breach was the consequence of what the employee himself had done or failed to 
do. Significantly, Beatson LJ held that Safeway was not applicable; there was no public policy 
reason to prevent the company from bringing an action against the director under section 174 of 
the UK Companies Act 2006 who had completely abdicated his responsibility of ensuring 
compliance with the health and safety regulation. 59 
                                                 
56  Brumder v Motornet [2013] EWCA Civ 195. 
57  SI 1998 No 2306. 
58  Ginty v Belmont Building Supplies [1959] 1 All ER 414.  
59  In a footnote to the judgment, Stone & Rolls was distinguished on the grounds that it concerned an action 
brought by the company against a third party (the auditors) and that it concerned an insolvent company.  
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When Brumder v Motornet and Safeway are read together, the conclusion is startling 
since it appears that a careless director can be held to be liable to the company under section 174 
of the UK Companies Act 2006 for having caused the company to breach the safety and 
workplace regulation but not when he acted intentionally to engage in price-fixing that caused 
the company to breach the UK Competition Act 1998.60  
 
It may be argued that on the facts, Brumder can be distinguished from Safeway for a 
further reason not cited in the judgment; Brumder involves a breach of the workplace safety 
regulation, which is a strict liability offence, and strict liability offences are arguably outside the 
ex turpi causa rule in the first place.61 It is outside the scope of this article to determine the kinds 
of turpitude62 that engage the illegality defence but it is submitted that the better view is not to 
draw a distinction between criminal and regulatory offences or offences involving fault and strict 
liability offences. A regulatory offence can be equally aimed at ensuring that the company or 
business entity takes care that it would comply with its obligations, just like a criminal offence. 
There is no real reason for the distinctive treatment the regulatory offences and non-regulatory 
offences.  
 
It is submitted that the courts should be slow in finding that the legislative policy behind 
criminalising (or quasi-criminalising) the offence is contravened by allowing the company to 
                                                 
60  See also C. Wells, “Corporate crime: opening the eyes of the sentry” (2010) 30 Legal Studies 370 at 377 
(who argues that “[t]he more diluted the criminal, fault-based terminology of the offences, the easier it is to argue 
around an ex turpi causa defence”).  
61  In Safeway, Longmore LJ left the question open, but it was implicit that the court would regard a strict 
liability offence as one which will not attract the defence (n 9 above), para [18]).  
62  See also Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex [2015] AC 430 (holding civil torts do not constitute turpitude, 
other than those of which dishonesty constitutes an essential element and corruption).  
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recover from its directors or officers.63 Whether or not the company is to be held primarily or 
directly liable under the rule determines whether the company is to be attributed with the 
knowledge or actions of a corporate agent. It does not (and should not) affect the relationship 
between the company has with its agents. Thus, it is submitted that in Safeway, the fact that the 
company was primarily or directly liable under the Competition Act does not affect the legal 
relationship that the company has with its directors or officers.  
 
 
[A head] Rules of Attribution  
 
Moving on to the question of attribution, for the illegality defence to apply, the acts and 
knowledge of the delinquent director or officer has to be attributed to the company. If the acts or 
knowledge of the delinquent director or officer are not so attributed to the company, illegality 
becomes irrelevant.  This section argues that recent development of the case law on whether the 
delinquent director’s acts or knowledge should be attributed to the company has taken a wrong 
turn in two respects. In particular, the distinction that is drawn between vicarious liability and 
direct liability and whether the director is or is not sole-actor of the company are merely red 
herrings. Instead, using the taxonomy that has been developed by recent case law, namely, 
Jetivia v Bilta, 64 of the three situations: (1) where the third party is suing the company arising 
from misconduct of the director or officer, (2) where the company is suing the director or officer 
for breach of duty; and (3) where the company is suing third parties for breach of duty owed to 
                                                 
63  For examples in the US where legislative or administrative policies explicitly prohibiting loss-shifting 
claims, see R Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls" (1984) 93 Yale LJ 857, 876 
ff.  
64  See Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [87]. 
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it,65 this article argues that in situations (2) and (3), the rules of attribution should be fact 
sensitive to the relevant constituencies of the company.  
 
[B Head] The Background on Attribution 
 
As the company is an artificial construct whose acts depend on individuals, the law has to 
derive rules of attribution to companies. The legislation may prescribe whether the knowledge of 
the key management officers is attributed to the company.66 Often, the legislation is silent and 
rules of attribution are found in the common law. At common law, in addition to agency law, the 
company may be attributed the knowledge of its directing “mind and will” 67 or in accordance 
with the rules set out by Lord Hoffmann the Privy Council decision of Meridian Global Fund 
Management Asia v Securities Commission (Meridian).68 According to Lord Hoffmann in 
Meridian, the primary rules of attribution can be discerned from the constitutional allocation of 
the company under the memorandum and articles of association, board resolutions and 
shareholder resolutions. The secondary (and special) rules of attribution are to be determined 
specifically in the context of particular substantive rules.69  
 
                                                 
65  On the analysis of attribution, see also E. Lim “Attribution in Company Law” (2014) 77(5) MLR 780. 
66  E.g. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 90A and Sch.10A, which provide that an issuer of 
securities is liable to compensate investors for misleading corporate disclosures but only where a person 
“discharging managerial responsibilities” within the company knew or was reckless as to a misstatement or 
dishonestly concealed a material fact. Persons who are “discharging managerial responsibilities” include a director.   
67  Lennard's Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 
68  Meridian Global Fund Management Asia v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500. 
69  See Meridian Global Fund Management v Securities Commission: 
“This is always a matter of interpretation: given that [the substantive rule] was intended to apply to a 
company, how was it intended to apply? … One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual 
canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and 
policy.” (n 68 above), p 507. 
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The question then arises is whether the company is attributed the unlawful acts or 
knowledge when the company has itself been the victim of activities by a person whose 
knowledge or fraud would have under the rules been attributed to the company. Prior to Jetivia v 
Bilta, the courts have adopted an exception to the ordinary rules of attribution, also known as the 
Hampshire Land exception (or the fraud exception or the breach of duty exception), 70 which 
prevents the attribution of the agent’s71 wrongdoing to the company as to do otherwise will be 
contrary to common sense and justice.  
 
In Re Hampshire, the articles of the company restricted the company from borrowing 
unless authorised in general meeting. The company sent out a notice of general meeting 
purporting to borrow from a society. The notice was defective, and it was known to W, the 
secretary of the company. W was also the secretary of the society. The question was whether 
W’s knowledge of the defectiveness of the notice was attributed to the society; if so, then the 
society could not rely on Turquand’s rule72 which would have allowed a third party to presume 
that the internal procedures were properly complied with, and then unable to prove the loan in 
the liquidation of the company. Vaughan Williams J held that the knowledge of W was not 
attributable to the society because “common sense at once leads one to the conclusion that it 
would be impossible to infer that the duty of either giving or receiving notice will be fulfilled 
where the common agent is himself guilty of fraud”.73 
 
                                                 
70  Re Hampshire Land  Company  [1896] 2 Ch 743.  
71  In Stone & Rolls, Lord Walker describes Re Hampshire Land as a principle of agency (Stone & Rolls (n 11 
above), para [138]).  
72  Royal British Bank v Turquand [1843-60] All ER Rep 435. 
73  Re Hampshire Land (n 70 above), p 749. 
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The reasoning of Vaughan Williams J was subsequently adopted by the House of Lords 
in Houghton & Co v Nothard, Lowe & Wills (Houghton).74 In that case, two of the four directors 
of the company procured the company to commit to an arrangement with a third party that 
amounted to a breach of the two complicit directors’ no conflict rules and the board did not 
approve the arrangement. The third party argued that the knowledge of the two complicit 
directors was attributed to the company, which would then be estopped from denying the 
existence of the agreement. Viscount Dunedin rejected the argument, citing Re Hampshire Land. 
 
 Both Re Hampshire Land and Houghton were cases involving the attribution of 
knowledge of the directors to the company, rather than any wider act of dishonesty or 
wrongdoing. Subsequent cases have then extended the non-attribution to other acts, including 
Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture (No. 2)75 (though Hampshire Land was not cited), 
discussed below.  
 
 However, until Jetivia v Bilta, the development of the case law on the proper scope of the 
attribution rules post- Re Hampshire was fraught with difficulties. First, Jonathan Sumption QC 
(now Lord Sumption) in Stone & Rolls76 advocated the distinction between vicarious and 
personal liability, holding that the Re Hampshire exception does not apply if the company’s 
liability under the legislation is direct and not vicarious. This distinction was applied in Safeway 
v Twigger, and reiterated by Lord Sumption in Jetivia v Bilta. Second, Lord Walker in Stone & 
Rolls advocated a “sole-actor” exception, holding that there is an exception to the Re Hampshire 
                                                 
74  Houghton & Co v Nothard, Lowe & Wills [1928] AC 1.  
75  Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture (No. 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393. 
76  Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), para [8]. 
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Land rule in the case where the claim is made by a one-man company that was engaged in fraud 
against its auditors, and the auditors are alleged to have failed to prevent the fraud. In this paper, 
one-man company refers broadly to a company whether there is a sole director cum shareholder 
and also where all of the shareholders and the active directors are complicit in the fraud.77 
 
The following section explains why both distinctions are either inaccurate or incomplete. 
In the case of the former, the distinction between direct and vicarious liability is only relevant to 
the question of whether fault is required to be shown and should not lead to any wider principles 
relating to attribution.  In the case of the latter, the characterisation of the sole actor exception is 
incomplete because it fails to take into account the three situations set out above.  Instead, this 
article argues that the rules of attribution should be fact sensitive to the relevant constituencies of 
the company in claims that are made by the company against the delinquent director or officer or 
against a third party.  
 
[B head] The red herrings 
[C head] The distinction between direct and vicarious liability 
In the majority judgment in Safeway v Twigger, Longmore LJ asked whether the liability 
of the company to pay the fine or incur the losses is direct or vicarious; the illegality defence 
only bars claims when the company’s liability under the relevant legislation is direct and not if it 
is vicarious or otherwise attributed to the company under the laws of agency.78 The argument is 
that where personal responsibility is imposed, it is not open to the company to argue that Re 
                                                 
77  According to Lord Walker, in Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), a one man company is one where there is no 
director or shareholder which is not complicit in the fraud (para 150). Berg, Sons & Co Ltd v Mervyn Hampton 
Adams (1992) [2002] Lloyd’s Rep PN 41 was cited.  
78  Safeway v Twigger (n 9 above), paras [26]-[27]. 
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Hampshire Land principle, which prevents the attribution of acts of the agent to principal where 
the agent commits fraud on the principal, to say it was not liable.  Thus, even though Safeway did 
not concern a one-man company, as the company admitted that it was personally at fault, the 
illegality defence was held to bar the company’s claim on the ground that the wrongdoing (the 
contravention of the Competition Act 1988) was personal to the company.  
 
In Singapore, in Ho v Scintronix, the Court of Appeal also adopted the distinction 
between direct and vicarious liability it was held that the attribution of liability to the company 
“via principles of agency and vicarious liability” were not relevant since the company itself must 
be responsible for the wrong.79 It was found that the company was not personally responsible for 
the wrongful payment of the bribe and hence was not barred from bringing the action against the 
delinquent director.  
 
This distinction between direct and vicarious liability has its roots in the concession made 
by Jonathan Sumption QC (now Lord Sumption) in Stone & Rolls80 and was reiterated by Lord 
Sumption in Jetivia v Bilta. While Lord Sumption in Jetivia v Bilta advocated this distinction as 
central to the illegality defence, it was criticised by Lords Toulson and Hodge in the same case.  
Lords Toulson and Hodge agreed with Professor Watts,81 in holding that there was no good 
reason why a principal who becomes directly a party to an illegal agreement cannot enforce its 
rights under a separate (and legal contract). Lords Toulson and Hodge accepted that the holding 
of Longmore LJ, that if taken to its logical conclusion, this leads to the absurd conclusion that 
                                                 
79  Ho v Scintronix, (n 12 above), para [69]. 
80  Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), para [8]. 
81  P. Watts, “Illegality and agency law: authorising illegal action” (n 38 above). 
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Safeway would not be able to terminate the services of the errant employee on the ground that it 
is relying on its own misconduct.   
 
It is respectfully suggested that Lords Toulson and Hodge were right to reject the 
touchstone of attribution to the company as turning on whether the criminal or quasi-criminal 
liability incurred by the company under the legislation was vicarious or direct. The legislation 
that imposes either vicarious or direct criminal liability on the company deems the company to 
be liable for the specific purpose of the legislation. The difference between the two is that 
vicarious liability does not require fault to be found on the part of the company but direct 
liability does require personal fault. However, such a conclusion should not have a bearing on 
ultimately whether the company is able to bring an action against its agents, including the 
directors or officers.  
 
The point is best illustrated by Ho v Scintronix. In that case, as highlighted earlier, the 
assumption that appears to be made was that the payment of the bribe by the chief executive 
officer contravened the anti-bribery laws in China.  It appears to be assumed that the liability for 
payment of the bribe was vicariously incurred by the company. No consideration was given as to 
whether it is also possible that the company could also be regarded as personally at fault for not 
putting in place procedures to ensure that bribery does not take place among its employees under 
the relevant Chinese law. Presumably as evidence of Chinese law was not adduced, Singapore 
law was applied, and under Singapore law, the giver of the bribe would be liable under its 
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bribery legislation.82 Yet, the more fundamental question is whether it should matter? It is 
submitted that the answer is no; it is unhelpful to distinguish between personal or vicarious 
liability for the purpose of determining whether the company is able to bring the claim against 
the director or officer. To be clear, this article argues that the outcome of Ho v Scintronix is 
correct, that is, the company should be able to bring the claim against the director because 
consideration should be given to the non-complicit shareholders but the reasoning based on 
personal and vicarious liability is unhelpful.  
 
[C head] The sole-actor exception to Re Hampshire 
 
In Stone & Rolls, Lord Walker and Lord Brown (two of the judges in the majority) took 
the view that the company as a one-man firm, whose sole directing mind and will was solely 
responsible for the fraud, and there were no innocent participants. As it is a one-man firm, Lord 
Walker held that the sole actor exception to the Re Hampshire rule applied. Thus the directing 
mind and will’s acts and knowledge were attributed to the company.  
 
The difficulty with the sole-actor exception, as was pointed out by Lord Sumption83 and 
Lords Toulson and Hodge,84 in Jetivia v Bilta, is that it fails to distinguish properly the three 
situations described above where attribution rules are relevant: (1) where the third party is suing 
the company arising from the wrongdoing of its director or officer, (2) where the company is 
                                                 
82  The Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 rev. edn) in Singapore does not have the equivalent of 
section 7 of the Bribery Act 2000. 
83  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [87]. 
84  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [205]. 
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suing the director for breach of duty and (3) where the company is suing the third party for 
breach of duty.  
 
The following section provides a taxonomy on how the illegality defence operates in the 
three situations. It argues that the relevant constituencies of the company should be considered. 
In situation (2), attribution should not occur to bar the claim if the company is insolvent (since 
the benefits go to the creditors) or if the company is solvent, there are innocent shareholders. (It 
is irrelevant to consider a solvent company suing a delinquent director/officer who is also a sole 
shareholder since this is a most unlikely scenario.) In situation (3), attribution should not occur if 
the company is insolvent or if there are innocent shareholders, or if the delinquent 
director/officer (who is also a sole shareholder), will not indirectly benefit from the corporate 
claim brought against third parties in connection with his wrongdoing.   
 
[B head] The Three Situations 
 
[C head] Where the third party is suing the company arising from the dishonest conduct of the 
director or officer 
   
If the third party is bringing an action against the company for a wrong (such as fraud 
practiced by the director or officer), it is now well established that illegality is not an issue. 
According to Patten LJ in Bilta v Nazir,85 which was approved, on appeal, by Lord Sumption and 
                                                 
85 Bilta v Nazir [2014] 1 Ch 52, para [34] (per Patten LJ).   
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Lords Toulson and Hodge,86 and also by Lord Walker in Moulin Global Eyecare,87 the company 
is attributed with the wrongdoing of the director or officer because the third party’s interest takes 
priority (even if the result is that the company bears the consequences of the unlawful act). Thus, 
if the law requires that the company to have a certain state of mind to be liable directly either in 
civil law (such as in the knowing receipt cases88) or under the specific legislation,89 the company 
will attributed with the knowledge so as to be affixed with liability. In such a case, it does not 
matter whether the company is solvent or whether it is a one-man company.  
 
[C head] Where the company is suing the director or officer 
I then turn to the second situation, where the company is suing the director or officer for 
breach of duty; in such a case, I argue that the act or knowledge of director or officer should not 
be attributed to the company where the company is insolvent (irrespective of whether the 
company is a one-man firm or has innocent shareholders). Whether the company is solvent, 
attribution of the delinquent director or officer should not occur to bar the claim where the 
company has innocent shareholders (whether partially or wholly).  
 
 
 
Insolvent companies 
                                                 
86  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), paras [88]; [205]. 
87  Moulin Global Eyecare (n 13 above), para [104]. 
88  Eg El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd [1994] 2 All ER 685 (this does not concern a one-man firm but a 
publicly listed company). 
89 Eg Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (n 67 above). 
35 
 
I first consider the position of insolvent companies. Support can be found in the breach of 
capital maintenance cases, which involve the liquidators of the insolvent company bringing an 
action against either the directors or shareholders who have improperly received the capital. In 
Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture (No. 2),90 the liquidators of the company successfully 
sued, among others, its directors for misfeasance and the repayment of monies that were 
wrongfully paid in contravention of the prohibition on financial assistance provisions in the 
Companies Act 1948. In Cooks v Green,91 and Re A Flap Envelope Limited,92 each involves a 
company which undertook a whitewash waiver in connection with the use of its (the company’s) 
assets to finance the sale of the shares of the company but the waiver was defective due to the 
inaccuracy of the disclosures regarding the solvency of the company. The directors were held to 
be liable to the company in negligence for causing the company to provide illegal financial 
assistance, notwithstanding the illegality of the transaction committed by the company. It should 
be noted that Belmont Finance did not concern a one-man company, though Cooks v Green and 
Re A Flap Envelope did.93  
 
In each of Belmont Finance, Cooks v Green and Re A Envelope, the company has been 
successful in recovering against its directors which caused the company losses (which will 
benefit the creditors) by entering into transactions in breach of the capital maintenance rules, 
even though the company has contravened the UK Companies Act 2006 (or its predecessor 
legislation). While the rationale expressed is that these rules exist for the protection of the 
                                                 
90  Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture (No. 2) (n 75 above). 
91  Cooks v Green [2009] BCC 204 
92  Re A Flap Envelope Limited [2004] 1 BCLC 64. 
93  See Stone & Rolls, para [138] (on interpretation of Belmont Finance). As for Cooks v Green (n 91 above), 
the two culpable directors were also the sole shareholders of the company. As for Re A Flap Envelope (n 92 above), 
the directors of the company controlled the shareholdings of the company, both directly and indirectly.  
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“company”, so the company can recover from its directors or shareholders for assets paid away 
improperly.94  The “company” in this context would ordinarily mean the creditors, since the 
“company” is insolvent.  
Innocent shareholders 
Moving to solvent companies, we are only concerned with the situation involving a 
solvent company with wholly or partly innocent shareholders. (A solvent company which is a 
one-man firm will not bring an action against its delinquent director.) It is submitted that the acts 
and knowledge of the delinquent director should not be attributed to the company so as to bar the 
recovery if the company has wholly innocent shareholders.  
 
In Stone & Rolls, counsel for the auditors conceded that if the company had sued the 
“directing mind and will” for breaching his duties to the company for misfeasance and causing 
the company losses, the claim would be barred by ex turpi causa on the ground that the 
“directing mind and will” would be attributable to the company.95 The majority of the House of 
Lords rejected the assertion that attribution would automatically happen (as it would have a far-
reaching effect), but left open the question as to whether the claim by the company against the 
director would have been barred if the company had independent shareholders who were 
unaware of the fraud by the “directing mind and will”.  However, in Jetivia v Bilta, Lord 
Neuberger (with whom Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed),96 Lord Sumption97 and Lords 
                                                 
94  See Belmont Finance v Williams Furniture [1979] 1 Ch 250 at 261.    
95  Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), para [29]. This concession may be open to question because if the company is 
insolvent, the creditors of the company will be the ones who are prejudiced by the defence, rather than the sole 
shareholder of the company.  
96  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [26].  
97  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [80]. 
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Toulson and Hodge98 held that the illegality defence has no application if the company has 
wholly innocent shareholders, indicating the reason being that there is no attribution of the 
director’s or officer’s dishonesty to the  company.  
 
 
Further support can be seen in the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in Ho v Scintronix, 
where the Singapore-incorporated and listed company was able to recover the bribe that was paid 
by its former chief executive officer to secure contracts for the company in a China. While it was 
not articulated in the judgment, it appears to be assumed that the bribes were paid contrary to the 
laws of China, since the bribes were paid in China for the company’s Chinese operations.99 The 
Court of Appeal refused to attribute the wrongdoing of the director to the company.  The primary 
rules of attribution were held not to apply because the independent directors of the board were 
not aware of the bribe and that being a publicly listed company, there were obviously innocent 
shareholders not complicit in the bribe.100  
 
Where the solvent company has complicit and innocent shareholders, the position is more 
complex. In such a case, so long as the outcome does not lead to the complicit shareholder 
recovering the benefits arising from the unlawful act (through the increase in value of the 
company), there should not be a bar to recovery. In other words, the complicit shareholder 
                                                 
98  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [161]. 
99  Singapore criminal law is unlikely to be relevant because the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 
rev ed), which prohibits the giving of bribes, has extra-territorial effect only in respect of bribes committed by 
Singapore “citizens” and companies would not fall within that provision. In contrast, the UK Bribery Act 2010, s 12, 
has extra-territorial application, covering persons with close connection with the UK, including UK incorporated 
companies. See W.Y. Wan “Corporate Claims Against Director for Paying Bribes on Company’s Behalf: Ho Kang 
Peng v Scintronix (formerly TTL Holdings)” (2014) LMCLQ 478 
100  It is not clear from the judgment whether Ho is also a shareholder of the company.  
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cannot benefit from the recovery but at the same time, the innocent shareholders should not be 
prejudiced. One possibility is, as highlighted by Lord Mance in Stone & Rolls, which is to 
impound the distributions of the company to the delinquent shareholder cum director, pursuant to 
In re VGM Holdings Ltd.101  
 
[C head] Where the company is suing the third party for breach of duty 
 
In the third situation, the context of the claim is important. In respect of corporate claims 
against third parties, in Moulin Global Eyecare, the majority of the Court of Final Appeal 
identified at least three categories that have posed some difficulties: (1) claims that are of a 
“redress” nature (which include claims against third party accomplices or accessories of the 
delinquent directors and are distinct from “liability” claims), (2) claims that are closely related to 
“redress” cases, such as claims that are brought against auditors102 or against insurers,103 in each 
case, for breach of its contractual obligation in failing to discover internal fraud or refusing to 
provide the agreed protection against risk of fraud respectively and (3) claims that are neither 
“redress” nor “liability” cases, such as in Moulin Global Eyecare (whose facts are described 
below) where the defendant is not an accomplice of the delinquent director or officer nor is there 
a pre-existing contractual relationship that exists between the company and the third party. These 
categories are by no means exhaustive but they provide a starting point for discussion. 104 
 
                                                 
101 In re VGM Holdings Ltd [1942] Ch 235. See Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), para [254]. 
102  E.g. Stone & Rolls (n 11 above).  
103  E.g. Arab Bank v Zurich Insurance [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 262. 
104  See also Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [207], where Lords Toulson and Hodge held that if the company 
is suing a third party for breach of duty owed to the company, whether the acts or knowledge of the director is 
attributed to the company depends on the claim. In a claim by the company against an insurer and the defence raised 
is one of material non-disclosure, the director’s knowledge of circumstances will be attributed to the company. 
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This article argues that in all of the three categories above, instead of drawing a 
distinction between “redress” and “liability” cases, consideration should be given to the 
constituencies of the company. Attribution should not occur to bar the claim if the corporate 
result is one that prejudices the non-complicit constituencies of the company. Hence, the act or 
knowledge of director or officer should not be attributed to the company where the company is 
insolvent (irrespective of whether the company is a one-man firm or has innocent shareholders). 
In this respect, it argues that Stone & Rolls and Moulin Global Eyecare are wrongly decided. 
Whether the company is solvent, the act of director or officer should not be attributed to the 
company so as to bar the claim if the company has wholly innocent shareholders or where the 
result is one which will not lead to the director or officer (who is also the sole shareholder) 
benefitting from his wrongdoing.  
 
Insolvent companies 
If the company is seeking “redress”105 by claiming against the third party accessories of 
the delinquent directors or officers in respect of their actions (such as actions based on knowing 
receipt or knowing assistance), attribution of the acts or knowledge of the delinquent directors of 
officers to the company should not occur if the company is insolvent for the reasons that are set 
forth in the preceding section involving the second situation. The “company” in this context 
would ordinarily mean the creditors, since the “company” is insolvent, and there is no good 
reason to deny the creditors recovery. 
 
                                                 
105  The redress/liability distinction was drawn in Moulin Global Eyecare (n 13 above), para [12].  
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Outside of the clear “redress” cases, such as the company claiming against its auditors for 
failing to detect fraud (as in Stone & Roll) or claiming in respect of overpaid taxes (such as in 
Moulin Global Eyecare), the position is more controversial since there is a risk that the 
delinquent director or shareholder may benefit indirectly from the corporate claim. However, 
once consideration is given as to the constituencies of the company, the answer is clear. If the 
company is insolvent, the company should ordinarily mean the creditors and there is no good 
reason for the rules on attribution to bar recovery for the benefit of the creditors. In this respect, 
and as argued above, it is submitted that the outcome of Stone & Rolls is incorrect.106  
 
In Moulin Global Eyecare, it was a case not involving an action brought by the company 
against the director or third party accessory but is an action brought by an insolvent company 
(which was publicly listed) against the Commissioner of Inland Revenue seeking to recover the 
taxes paid on inflated profits. In that case, certain of the executive directors of the board falsified 
the accounts to show that the operations were profitable in order to obtain substantial credit 
facilities, and tax was paid on the basis of the non-existent profits. The liquidators sought to 
recover these taxes which they argued were wrongly paid. Lord Walker (who was in the 
majority) held that the fraud exception in Re Hampshire Land did not operate to prevent the 
attribution of fraud of the delinquent directors cum controlling shareholders in the context of the 
relevant income tax legislation.107 His Lordship held that the decision of Court of Appeal in Bilta 
v Nazir108 was correctly decided, and that the Re Hampshire Land exception only applied to bar 
the defence in claims by “corporate employers against dishonest directors or employees, or 
                                                 
106  See n 50 and accompanying text.  
107  The controlling shareholders of the company (which include the holdings by the errant director and 
members of his family) held 40%, and it decreased to 30% during the relevant period. 
108  Bilta v Nazir (n 85 above). 
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accomplices who have conspired with them”. 109 The facts of Moulin Global Eyecare were 
distinguishable from Bilta v Nazir as the former is not a “redress” case; it is a claim against the 
Commissioner which is not an accomplice of the fraudster. His lordship took the view that it 
would frustrate the statutory scheme if the fraud exception could apply as it would undermine the 
certainty that the Commissioner should be able to rely on tax payers’ returns. Lord Walker also 
expressly withdrew from his position in Stone & Rolls that the fraud exception is of general 
application and unspecific to the context.   
 
Tang PJ, delivering the minority judgment, held that Re Hampshire exception should 
apply to prevent the attribution of the fraudulent directors to the company because there was no 
reason “why a company whose management was negligent or inept should be better off than one 
where innocent shareholders had suffered at the hands of fraudulent management”.110Tang PJ 
also alluded to the fact that the victims were not only its innocent shareholders but also the 
creditors.  
 
It is respectfully submitted the more persuasive judgment is that of Tang PJ. Given that  
the rules of attribution are matters of policy, when the company is insolvent, the courts ought to 
have regard to the interests of the creditors as the relevant constituencies. The acts or knowledge 
of the director or officer should not be attributed to the company so as to bar the company’s 
claim since the benefit of the action brought accrues to the creditors.  
 
Innocent shareholders 
                                                 
109  Moulin Global Eyecare (n 13above), para [135]. 
110  Moulin Global Eyecare (n 13 above), para [29]. 
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I then consider the situations where the solvent company has wholly innocent 
participants. If the company has wholly innocent participants, there is no reason to attribute the 
wrongdoing of the director or officer to the company so as to bar the company’s claim for the 
reasons that apply in the second situation. 
 
One man firm 
If the company is a one-man firm, the position is more complex since it is conceivable 
that the delinquent shareholder cum director can profit from the damages recoverable from the 
third party through the increase in value of the company (a scenario which does not occur in the 
second situation). In Stone & Rolls, Lord Phillips alluded to this possibility, holding that that the 
guilty shareholder should not be able to profit (such as if the damages recoverable from the 
auditors was so large as to make the company solvent) though his Lordship acknowledged that 
this was an unlikely event.111 However, the better approach is to consider the constituencies of 
the company and whether the sole shareholder will benefit from the corporate claim. In this 
regard, the wrongdoing director or officer remains liable to the company for breach of duty. In 
Jetivia v Bilta, Lords Toulson and Hodge pointed out that the benefits will not accrue to the sole 
shareholder cum director because even if the company does not sue the director, the third party 
can claim, through contribution proceedings under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1976, 
against the sole director cum shareholder. 112 Thus, if the delinquent director cum shareholder 
will not benefit from the corporate claim brought against third parties, there is thus no reason to 
                                                 
111  Stone & Rolls (n 11 above), para [61]. 
112  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [207]. 
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bar such recovery. Thus the conclusion is that whether the company is a one-man firm or has 
innocent participants will not make a difference to the outcome in this third situation.  
 
Thus, in the third situation, given that there is no difference in treatment as to whether the 
company has innocent participants or is a one man company, if the company has a mix of 
innocent and complicit shareholders, attribution would not occur so as to bar the company’s 
claim.  
 
[A head] Conclusion 
 
It has been said that the law on the illegality defence has two conflicting goals. They are 
the need for “principle, clarity and certainty in the law” and achieving a “fair and appropriate 
result” in each case.113 If directors and officers are not liable to compensate the company in 
respect of losses that are consequent upon the unlawful conduct, the unsatisfactory outcome 
would be that directors and officers who have caused the company to engage in unlawful 
conduct would escape any consequences (other than possibly facing dismissal, reputational 
losses and disqualification orders114). If an action is brought against the directors for negligently 
failing to supervise the acts of the employees, it follows from the reasoning that the action will 
also be barred on the ground of illegality.115 In the UK, mere breach of directors’ duties under 
the UK Companies Act 2006 only carries civil consequences and not civil penalties or criminal 
                                                 
113  Jetivia v Bilta (n 10 above), para [13].  
114  The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 provides that the courts may disqualify directors if, 
among other things, the court is satisfied that his conduct in relation to the company makes him unfit to be 
concerned in the management of the company, thus raising the possibility that a director may be disqualified on the 
ground of  negligence or incompetence. 
115  Cf see S. Watson, “Conceptual Confusion: Organs, Agents and Identity in the English Courts” (2011) 23 S 
Ac LJ 762.   
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liabilities.116 Civil or administrative penalties can be imposed on directors but only in the narrow 
context of specific legislation.117   
 
Yet Ho v Scintronix has shown that directors and officers have incentives to engage in 
legally suspect activities, even if the benefits of such conduct may only accrue to the company 
directly.118 The reasons could range from meeting investor expectations (in the case of public 
companies) or in the case of middle managers, unrealistic expectations set by those at the top of 
the organisational hierarchy.119  
  
This article provides a taxonomy of illegality defence that is often raised in such claims. 
It argues that absent clear legislative justification, none of the policy justifications underlying the 
defence of illegality apply to bar the company’s claim. Further, in applying the rules of 
attribution, in claims that are brought by the company against the delinquent director or officer or 
third party, the courts should consider the relevant constituencies of the claimant company in 
determining whether the result of the recovery would benefit the delinquent director or officer. If 
the company is insolvent, there is generally no risk that the recovery would result in such 
benefits. Likewise, if the company is solvent but has innocent shareholders, recovery would not 
result in such benefits. If the company is a one-man firm, so long as the law has sufficient ways 
                                                 
116  Section 178(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that the consequences of breach (or 
threatened breach) of sections 171 to 177 are the same as would apply if the corresponding common 
law rule or equitable principle applied. 
117  Eg Financial Services and Markets Act, s 118 (penalties for market abuse).  
118  Cf R. Kraakman, “Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls” (1984) 93 Yale LJ 
857,879 (arguing that on a cost-benefit analysis, there are few incentives for managers who are not shareholders to 
enter into illicit conduct). 
119  See generally J. Coffee, "‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386, 397ff. 
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to ensure that delinquent director or officer does not benefit from the corporate recovery from 
third parties, there is no reason for his act or knowledge to be attributed to the company.  
